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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the dynamics of child income poverty in 
New  Zealand. Annual movements into and out of poverty by children’s 
households in New Zealand over the 1997/98, 1998/99, and 1999/2000 periods 
are analysed. The annual Income Supplement to the Household Labour Force 
Survey allows tracking of dwellings and people in two consecutive June quarterly 
weeks, and thus allows observation of changes in equivalised household 
disposable income over a June year. This project is the first to use the Linked 
Income Survey for analysis of income dynamics and is part of the Ministry of 
Social Policy’s ongoing research on family dynamics. 
New Zealand adult and child poverty transitions are compared. Child 
poverty transitions in New Zealand are compared and contrasted to those of five 
other countries—Britain, Germany, Hungary, Russia and Spain—where a similar 
current income measure of poverty is available. The frequency of poverty “trigger 
events” in New Zealand and their impact on the chances of children exiting and 
entering poverty are compared to similar data for Britain and West Germany. 
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The Ministry of Social Development is currently implementing a 
research programme on family dynamics, focussing on the influence of family 
environments on child outcomes through time. Our paper is part of this wider 
research programme. Our paper considers one dimension of the broad family 
environment facing children, that of income poverty. 
Living in a low-income household is a poor outcome in itself for a 
child, as poverty reduces consumption possibilities for children (see Greg Duncan, 
Jeanne Brooks-Gunn and Pamela Klebanov 1994, p. 297; OECD 2001, p. 47; 
Child Poverty Action Group 2001). This lower consumption is an issue of policy 
concern, since children have neither the exit opportunities nor the chance to have 
a voice that adults do. 
In addition, there is a fairly strong statistical association between low 
household income and poor outcomes influencing future life paths for children—
including their health, cognitive development, schooling, and delinquency—as 
well as low income as adults. Some of this association is likely to be causal. But 
there is considerable debate as to whether income is significant, for what child 
outcomes, and also regarding the size of the income-child outcome elasticity 
(Greg Duncan and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn 1997; Susan Mayer 1997). The current 
body of evidence does suggest that income is more important for those in or close 
to poverty than for the reasonably well off or rich (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 
1997, p. 597). 
Thus our poverty focus, rather than an analysis of income distribution 
per se, arises out of evidence that relative deprivation of children at the bottom of 
the distribution is of importance for relative child outcomes later in life, a social 
investment issue, as well as because of a policy concern about social exclusion of 
children now. 
This paper considers child poverty in a dynamic rather than in the 
traditionally static context. Our research is among the first to use New Zealand 
data from the Linked Income Supplement (LIS) of the Household Labour Force 
Survey (HLFS), which links two years of data from the Income Supplement (IS) to 
allow a study of annual income dynamics. 2 
A consideration of the dynamics of child poverty is of a great deal of 
interest for a number of reasons (OECD 2001, p. 38; Bruce Bradbury, Stephen 
Jenkins and John Micklewright 2001c). 
Poverty transitions are important because it is likely that being poor for 
short periods is less developmentally harmful for children than sustained poverty. 
And even if the increase in income is not the cause of better child outcomes, the 
fact that it may be associated with unobservable factors which do lead to better 
outcomes means a focus on poverty transitions for children is of relevance. 
A study of poverty transitions of children provides information on 
whether poverty is concentrated amongst a small number of children or widely 
shared across the child population. Does policy need to be designed for a small 
number of children mired in poverty or for a group with very high turnover? 
(Bradbury, Jenkins and Micklewright 2001c). Only through examining transitions 
can this policy question be informed. 
A study of poverty transitions gets us one step closer to understanding 
causes of poverty and of the different factors contributing to inflows and outflows 
from child poverty, an important part of making good policy to reduce poverty 
(Stephen Jenkins 1998, pp. 2–3). 
At the same time a further aim of the study is utilise the international 
results to better inform New Zealand policy by adding a New Zealand component 
to the cross-national comparative work of child poverty dynamics reported in 
Bruce Bradbury, Stephen Jenkins and John Micklewright (2001a) and Stephen 
Jenkins and Christian Schluter (2001). 
Our paper develops as follows. 
In Section 2, we undertake a brief and selective literature review of 
relevant work on child poverty dynamics. The review provides a context to our 
analysis by detailing the methods and broad conclusions of the literature and the 
directions in which it is developing, and indicating where the current paper draws 
from and adds to this work. 
Our next two sections consider the data. Because the data set has not 
been used before in New Zealand, we consider it in detail. Section 3 describes the 
data and Section 4 discusses its limitations.  
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Section 5 discusses construction of the child poverty measure. 
One major potential limitation of the data is attrition of people from the 
sample from one year to the next. A fuller discussion of attrition in Section 6 
follows on from a consideration of data limitations and construction of child 
poverty measures. 
The substantive results begin with Section 7 comparing child and adult 
poverty results at a point in time and through time. 
The next section, Section 8, compares child poverty dynamics in 
New Zealand with those in a number of overseas countries described in Bradbury, 
Jenkins and Micklewright (2001a). This comparison provides an important 
benchmark for establishing the relative degree of child poverty dynamics in 
New Zealand. 
Section 9 also involves an international comparison with the UK and 
West Germany. The section examines events that may trigger exits from child 
poverty and the chances of exiting poverty conditional on experiencing a trigger 
event. It thus moves us towards developing a causal story of why households with 
children may exit poverty. It also considers poverty entry in an analogous fashion 
Section 10 concludes with the major findings of the research, discusses 
future directions of work, and touches on some broad implications for analysis 
and policy. 
This version of the paper is the comprehensive version. A streamlined 
version will be produced for publication. 
2  Selective literature review 
This literature review section places our analysis in the context of the 
existing body of research by detailing methods and broad conclusions, and the 
directions in which the literature is developing. 
We first touch upon New Zealand work on static income poverty and on 
income dynamics and then the international literature on comparing child poverty 
dynamics across countries. 4 
There is a small but growing body of New Zealand research on income 
poverty. As befits the relatively small scale of the research, much of it has a cross-
sectional measurement and descriptive focus (e.g. F. Brashares 1993; Vasantha 
Krishnan 1995; Brian Easton 1995a & 1995b; Bob Stephens, Charles Waldegrave 
and Paul Frater 1995; Charles Waldegrave, Shane Stuart and Bob Stephens 1996). 
To a large extent, the focus on cross-sections has been dictated by limits of the 
available data set, the now three-yearly Household Economic Survey. This work 
has thus far not had a particular focus on child poverty.  
There is another small amount of New Zealand literature on income and 
earnings mobility using Inland Revenue Department tax data (H. Smith and 
Robert Templeton 1990; John Creedy 1996; Dean Hyslop 2000). This literature 
considers individual income mobility of those people filing a tax return and 
cannot directly address issues of child poverty dynamics, for no information is 
collected on children. 
There is, however, some New  Zealand research on child poverty 
dynamics. One study has been undertaken on factors associated with transitions 
into and out of poverty using the Christchurch Child Health Development data 
(Tim Maloney and George Barker 2000; for an updated version see Tim Maloney 
2001).
1 While extremely valuable, the study is limited to a single-year cohort of 
around 1000 children and their families, rather than transitions for a cross section 
of New Zealand children.
2 The sample is neither geographically nor ethnically 
representative of New  Zealand as a whole, although it is socio-economically 
representative. In addition, the income data collected is somewhat crude. The 
study stops in 1991 because income data are no longer comparable through time. 
However, a major strength of the study is that it can be used to examine income 
transitions as children in the study age from one to fourteen years old. 
                                                           
1 The Dunedin Multi-disciplinary Child Health Development Study, New  Zealand’s other 
longitudinal child development study, has collected much more limited income information. 
Ranged mother and father figure income data was collected when subjects were aged 13 and 15 
years old. 
2 The unit of analysis for looking at poverty transitions in Maloney and Barker’s study is the 
family. Since there is typically only one child observation per family, this amounts to a child 
focus.  
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Considering the fourteen years of the children’s life trajectory between 
1978 and 1991, Maloney and Barker demonstrate considerable income mobility 
and immobility for the children’s family income. The mobility cup is half full or 
half empty, depending on one’s priors, a common finding too in the international 
literature on income dynamics (OECD 2001, p. 38). In addition, much of the 
income churning is from just under the poverty line to just over the poverty line 
(and vice versa). 
Using the international benchmark of an earlier version of Bradbury, 
Jenkins and Micklewright’s (2001c) book, Maloney’s comparative finding is that 
“New Zealand, relative to those other countries [in Bradbury et. al.] appears to 
have a moderate to low level of low-income persistence amongst children” 
(Maloney 2001, p. 32). 
In a further interesting analysis, Maloney and Barker use regression 
analysis to show that two-parent families, families experiencing large increases in 
weekly hours worked, and families close to the poverty line (defined as between 
the bottom and second to bottom quintile), are more likely to climb out of poverty. 
Falling into poverty is associated negatively with weekly hours of work of the 
mother and father, a transition to a single parent family, and proximity to the 
poverty threshold. 
An analysis of the impact of persistent poverty and the timing of 
poverty on later outcomes of the Christchurch study as the subjects move through 
adulthood would be a valuable extension of this work for the Ministry’s family 
dynamics project. 
There is also a body of overseas research considering income poverty 
dynamics issues for children and families that is of relevance to this project. Most 
of these studies use data sets specifically designed for longitudinal purposes where 
in many cases multiple transitions are observed. 
Our focus is on the work involving inter-country comparisons. 
However, we also consider research that involves consideration of poverty over a 
longer period of the child’s childhood and which looks at causes of flows into and 
out of poverty by children. We are interested in what the unit of analysis is for 6 
income attribution (the individual person or the household), how children are 
defined (age of child), and the definition of income used (e.g. pre- or post-tax). 
The first significant study of inter-country comparisons of child poverty 
dynamics is Greg Duncan et. al. (1993). They provide an inter-country 
comparison focussing on low-income families with children (defined as minors) 
as the unit of analysis. The countries included are Canada, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States. The income 
measure is pre-tax. The major aim of the paper is to consider whether mobility out 
of poverty, where poverty is defined as 50 per cent of median family income, is as 
great in other countries as in the USA. To eliminate small transitions from under 
to just above the poverty line, they require the transition out of poverty to be a 
“significant” jump over the poverty threshold. 
Of the countries considered, the USA had the highest cross-sectional 
poverty rate for families with children and the highest proportion of this 
population that was in poverty for each year of a three-year window (US equals 
14 per cent and Canada equals 12 per cent, compared to half of one per cent for 
the Netherlands). The spread of cross-country differences in escape rates from 
poverty varied substantially according to the poverty definition, but transitions out 
of poverty for families close to the poverty line were strikingly similar across 
countries. Thus the cause of the more persistent US and Canadian poverty was the 
much lower starting position of those families in poverty on average relative to the 
poverty line compared to European families. 
The most up-to-date work involving inter-country comparisons of child 
poverty dynamics builds on the earlier work of Duncan et. al. and has been 
published recently as a book, with a chapter comparing country outcomes and a 
variety of country-specific chapters (Bradbury, Jenkins and Micklewright 2001a). 
For our purposes the key chapter is that of Bradbury, Jenkins and 
Micklewright (2001c) which considers child poverty dynamics in the US, the UK, 
Germany, Ireland, Spain, Hungary and Russia. In accordance with the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Children, children are defined as those under 
eighteen years of age. Transitions are considered only for children (thus for one-
year transition windows the child sample is those between zero and seventeen  
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years in wave one, for two-year transition windows between zero and sixteen and 
so forth). Unlike Duncan et. al. (1993), the unit of analysis is the child, not the 
family with children. Sensitivity is examined to pre- and post-tax family income. 
Similar but not identical patterns of dynamics are found across the 
seven countries, with the exception of Russia, where economic change has led to 
very high churning. As expected, child poverty mobility increases as the 
observation window is extended through time. However, in the US and Germany 
roughly one in twenty children spend ten consecutive years of their lives in 
poverty. 
We now consider some international material addressing possible 
causal factors. A variety of proximate causes of child poverty dynamics can be 
identified (Bruce Bradbury, Stephen Jenkins and John Micklewright 2001b, pp. 
52–57). Children may enter poverty by being born into it. Equally they may leave 
poverty by becoming an adult. Putting aside these demographic causes, there are 
three other broad possibilities causing child poverty transitions: changes in 
household income associated with the labour market, other changes in income 
(associated primarily with the welfare system), and changes in the size and 
composition of the household. Changes in labour market income can be further 
decomposed into quantity effects (changes in hours worked, including becoming 
employed) and price effects (changes in earnings per unit time). Changes in 
household composition include divorce or separation and remarriage and re-
partnering as well as arrival of a newborn or departure of an older child (the latter 
due perhaps to relocation for work or study). 
There is some cross-country consideration of events associated with 
falling into poverty and escaping poverty for families with children in Duncan  
et. al. (1993). This work involves examining the frequency of “favourable events” 
(divided into marriage, job gain, more work, social insurance beginning) and 
“unfavourable events” (symmetrically divided into divorce, job loss, less work, 
social insurance ending) amongst families with children who exit or enter poverty 
for the eight countries in their study. The overall cross-country conclusion is that 
more people carry positive or negative labour market events over the poverty 
boundary than carry marriage market events. The finding of the relative 
importance of labour market events is replicated by the OECD (2001) for poverty 8 
transitions more generally. Duncan et. al.’s finding may reflect the fact that 
marriage market events are less frequent than labour market events, or that 
marriage market events are less likely to tip children into and out of poverty than 
labour market events. 
Using Canadian data and a more sophisticated approach than that of 
Duncan et. al. (1993), G. Picot, M. Zyblock and W. Pyper (1999) consider 
whether annual child poverty transitions are primarily due to changes in parental 
labour market status or changes in parental marital status. They find that changes 
in marital status are more strongly associated with child poverty transitions, but 
occur much less frequently than parental labour market transitions. 
Jenkins and Schluter (2001) consider why UK child poverty rates are 
higher than those in Germany. They provide a very useful decomposition in terms 
of “trigger events” and conditional probabilities of making a poverty transition 
given experience of the trigger event. 
In comparing Germany and the UK, Jenkins and Schluter find that it is 
cross-national differences in conditional probabilities of shifting having 
experienced a trigger event rather than differences in prevalence of the trigger 
events themselves that explain higher UK poverty entrance and lower exit than in 
Germany. 
Our select literature review reveals a certain amount of New Zealand 
and international material for comparison and validation later in our analysis. 
Additionally, the work reviewed provides useful methodologies that can be 
applied to the New Zealand data. And it is to the data that provides the major 
source material for this study to which we turn. 
3  The linked income supplement 
This section provides a detailed discussion of the longitudinal data used 
in this study. Our discussion of the data is longer than normal as this is the first 
piece of research to utilise this data. It is desirable that what we have learned is 
adequately documented. 
New Zealand’s  quarterly  Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) 
currently contains about 15,000 dwellings and 30,000 people. The sample is a  
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rotating panel, designed so as to facilitate the inter-temporal reliability of cross-
sectional estimates of labour force status.
3 The basic unit of sample selection is 
the geographic address. 
Each geographic address is in the panel for eight consecutive quarters. 
Each quarter, one-eighth of the panel drops out of the sample. Thus the entire 
panel turns over in a two-year period.
4 
While designed for cross-sectional purposes, the rotating panel of the 
HLFS provides potentially useful longitudinal information.
5 This information has 
been used to examine quarterly transitions in labour market status (e.g. Julie 
Woolf 1989; David Grimmond 1993; Brian Silverstone and Susi Gorbey 1994; 
Stuart Irvine 1994). However, it has not been used to examine longer-range 
transitions (more than one quarter), with the exception of some preliminary 
analysis by Diane Ramsay, Janette Briggs and Max Wigbout (2001). And it has 
not been used to consider issues of interest to child policy. 
In the dwelling’s first quarter the HLFS is a face-to-face survey.
6 The 
surveyor administers the household questionnaire to a householder of working age 
(15 years plus). The household questionnaire asks a range of questions for the 
reference week of the HLFS about age, gender, ethnicity, date of birth, 
relationship to the reference person and years in New Zealand of all people in the 
dwelling in the reference week. The interviewer then administers the personal 
questionnaire to the reference person and others of working age in the household 
                                                           
3 The approximately 37,000 Census mesh blocks are collapsed into 19,100 primary sampling units 
(PSUs), forming the basis of sample selection in the HLFS. PSUs typically contain between 50 and 
100 dwellings. The average is 65. PSUs are then divided into 120 groups dependent on region, 
age, family type, ethnicity, education, employment status and amenities (derived from the previous 
census). One thousand seven hundred and sixty PSUs are sampled, with nine households surveyed 
per PSU. Dwellings are allocated to groups, called panels, of about nine. Each panel is surveyed 
for eight quarters, after which it is rotated out. 
4 The Spanish data used by Bradbury, Jenkins and Micklewright 2001b and Olga Canto and 
Magda Mercader-Pratts 2001 to look at child poverty dynamics across eight European countries is 
a very similar “residence-based” quarterly rotating panel rotating an eighth of the sample out per 
quarter (Bradbury, Jenkins and Micklewright, 2001a). However, it has income information in 
every quarter, as opposed to every fourth quarter. 
5 In addition to the Spanish data set already mentioned in footnote four, similar data sets are used 
overseas for longitudinal purposes. Paul Gregg and Jonathan Wadsworth (2000) exploit the similar 
short-range panel of the British Household Labour Force Survey for longitudinal purposes and 
Franco Peracchi and FinisWelch (1995) discuss the US Current Population Survey (CPS). 
6 Thanks to Jacinda Dalziell of Statistics New Zealand for her great help in dealing with detail 
about collection of the surveys. 10 
who are present, after checking that the reference person’s answers on the relevant 
household questions for each householder of working age are correct. The 
personal questionnaire collects the labour market information for each person of 
working age living in the household during the reference week. In the physical 
absence of householders of working age, arrangements are made to visit and 
interview at a later date. Proxy responses on labour market outcomes are 
permissible only on behalf of relatives of the responder to the household 
questionnaire. If the responder is happy to provide proxy responses, these are 
acceptable. The process of future interviews is arranged at this first session. 
In the absence of any dwelling response in the first quarter, the surveyor 
visits the address two or three times and attempts to verify non-contact by asking 
neighbours if anyone is currently living in the dwelling. 
In six of the subsequent seven quarters the HLFS is administered by 
telephone to those within the scope of the survey, unless the dwelling has no 
telephone number in the first visit or if respondents express a preference for a 
face-to-face visit. The household details are checked and if necessary amended. 
The personal labour force questionnaire is administered over the phone with each 
person of working age. The surveyor may phone back 10 to 15 times at different 
times of different days to try and track the household and obtain responses to the 
personal questionnaire. There is no personal visit unless the phone number is 
disconnected. Again, there may be proxy phone responses to the personal 
questionnaire of the HLFS by the household respondent, but only on behalf of 
relatives. 
The  Income Survey (IS) of the HLFS occurs annually every June 
quarter. The IS has been running since 1997. It is designed to collect information 
on current hourly and weekly earnings and income from self-employment and 
from government benefits over the reference week of the HLFS. In addition it 
collects retrospective information on annual personal income from all sources by 
13 ranges over the previous year (Statistics New Zealand 2000a & 2000b). 
Unlike the HLFS, the IS must be personally administered face-to-face. 
No proxy responses to the IS are admitted. On the IS visit the HLFS is again 
personally and face-to face administered prior to collection of the IS. The main  
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Statistics New Zealand priority is to collect the HLFS, not the IS. Up to three 
personal visits are made if a response cannot be elicited on the first visit. Reasons 
for non-contact are coded. 
The factors mentioned above mean that there is much greater individual 
non-response to the IS than the HLFS, over and on top of the normal greater 
reluctance of people to report on their incomes than on their labour market status. 
Attrition is compounded as one individual non-response in a household knocks 
that household out of consideration for household income transitions. 
Because of the rotating nature of the panel, in theory half the dwellings 
in one IS will also be in the IS the following year. However, this is only currently 
the case in actuality for the 1997/98 data. Due to accelerated sample rotation the 
maximum dwelling linkages in the 1998/99 and 1999/2000 LIS are one quarter 
rather than one half. In the LIS for 2000/2001, there is a return to half the 
dwellings being eligible for linking in the sample. 
What are the possible reasons for the non-response to the IS? There is 
coding of non-dwelling HLFS response that may give scope for some further 
analysis.
7 People may die. People may be on holiday. People may be out of the 
dwelling when the data collection and the various follow-ups occur. People may 
move out of a household. People may refuse to respond, having responded in the 
previous year. 
                                                           
7 The household participation codes for the HLFS are 13: 1 = full response, 2 = full refusal, 3 = 
part refusal, 4 = verified full non-contact, 5 = non-verified full non-contact, 6 = part non-contact, 7 
= death and illness, 8 = all persons out of scope, 9 = vacant dwelling, 10 = dwelling under 
construction, 11 = dwelling converted to a non-dwelling, 12 = derelict dwelling, 13 = dwelling 
demolished or removed. Full response includes households where in wave 1 a couple were 
observed who split up in the interim and in wave two only one adult remains in the household and 
responds fully. Verified non-contact means at least 10 phone calls and visits by interviewers and 
confirmation with the neighbours the people are not in the dwelling in the reference week but do 
still live there. Death or illness means that people have not been interviewed because of 
sensitivities arising out of recent family death or current illness, rather than because they 
necessarily are dead or ill. 12 
4  Limitations of the linked income 
supplement as longitudinal data 
This section continues the discussion of the data set begun above, but 
focuses on limitations of the LIS data as longitudinal information. 
A primary weakness of the LIS is that only one annual income 
transition is observed. The important issue of re-entry into poverty following exit 
cannot be considered. In other words, while the data set can be used for an 
analysis of annual poverty dynamics, it cannot deal with important issues of 
persistent and cumulative poverty (Mary Bane and David Ellwood 1986; OECD 
2001, p. 40). That said, observing one transition is substantially better than 
observing no transitions at all, as in a cross-sectional data set. 
The point during the year where people enter or leave the household is 
not observed, and thus at what point they contribute to and call on the household’s 
resources. Typically true longitudinal data designs have a monthly event calendar 
to more accurately date trace such events in time.
8 
There are other issues. Because the LIS is address-based, more mobile 
sectors of the population are under-represented in the survey. The problem can be 
offset by use of longitudinal weights that re-weight for observed attrition biases. 
Nevertheless, if there are unobservable factors causing mobility between 
dwellings that the weights do not account for, attrition biases may remain. 
Attrition issues are discussed in more depth in Section 6. 
The data set contains information on children (defined as those under 
15 years of age) in each dwelling in terms of their age, sex, country of birth and 
ethnic group.
9 There is also information on their relationship to the adults in the 
dwelling. However, there is no other information included on children. In 
particular, there is no direct information on child outcomes allowing an 
examination of income and poverty on child outcomes. 
                                                           
8 There is a possibility that the interim quarters of HLFS could be used to more accurately date 
people entering and leaving a dwelling and entering and leaving paid employment. This may be 
worth following up in the future. 
9 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC), ratified by New Zealand, 
defines children as those under 18 years of age.  
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Because of significant non-response to the IS, income is often imputed. 
The imputation algorithm used searches for a record with the same demographic 
characteristics as the person with missing income and assigns them the income of 
the first complete and matching record found. This imputation approach occurs 
anew randomly for each new cross-section, independent of the record that was 
used for imputation in the previous wave. Thus income transitions will in all 
likelihood be overestimated as independent cross-sectional imputation of income 
records in either wave one or wave two is likely to lead to an observed change in 
income where none actually takes place. Sensitivity of results to inclusion and 
exclusion of imputed records can be used to examine the extent of this issue. 
Exclusion of imputed income records, our preferred option, reduces the 
number of the matched sample records by eliminating any children’s household 
where there is at least one imputed income record for any individual in the 
dwelling for either wave one or wave two. 
It may be possible in the future to increase the amount of information in 
the sample without adding spurious transitions through longitudinal imputation of 
individual income. For reasons of cost, this option was not pursued. 
Another issue is that the income data are address-based rather than 
family-based. However, the data set does include important information on the 
social (typically family) relationships between the children and the adults in the 
dwelling. 
Non-place-based family relationships cannot be explored. Equally, if 
one parent of a separated family with children has the children two nights a week, 
the contribution of the second household to the child’s food, clothing, housing, 
education and so on is not registered. Flows of resources from extended family 
members who are not present at the same address are also not captured. Such 
flows may be more important for Māori and Pacific children who are 
overrepresented amongst the poor. 
There is no information on wealth, or on actual or imputed income from 
other sources. For example, if child support is paid directly, it is not observed in 
the IS. 14 
Finally, the LIS contains neither consumption nor expenditure 
information that would have provided an alternative measure of household 
material wellbeing. 
5  Measuring child poverty using the linked 
income supplement 
Our study makes the unit of analysis the child. The unit of income 
accounting is the household. We use data on weekly total income of those who 
live in a household with at least one child, observed in both Income Supplements. 
Current PAYE tax rates are applied to the gross income to obtain after-tax 
personal weekly income. We make a series of adjustments for child support 
payments, assuming that weekly income questions are not picking up annual IRD 
family tax credits.
10 Net income is then summed across the household and 
equivalised using the square root of the number of people in the household. This 
net weekly household equivalised income is attached to each individual child in 
the household. 
The approach replicates as far as possible the methods followed in 
Bradbury, Jenkins and Micklewright (2001a) with the aim of making an 
international comparison which is as accurate as possible. 
We exclude from our analysis all households where there is any cross-
sectionally imputed income for any adult in the household in either the first or 
second period. Our belief, confirmed by the data, is the income imputation 
algorithm adds false transitions to the data. 
This study also uses the data on annual income as the accounting 
period. Annual income information, recalled over the previous year, is provided in 
the IS in ranges. We make point estimates of annual personal income using 1995 
Household Economic Survey mid-point estimates of ranges. PAYE tax rates are 
applied to the annual income estimate, and incomes are then again summed across 
the household, equivalised and attached the individual householders, adult and 
child. 
                                                           
10 For more detail on adjustments for child benefits, see Appendix A.  
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In theory more current weekly income variation is likely to be due to 
fluctuations in transitory income than for annual income variation. On the other 
hand the annual measure will miss short periods of poverty within the year, which 
may be harmful if there are constraints in the extent to which households can go 
into short-term debt to finance a within-year income shortfall. 
Evidence from the British Household Panel Survey suggests that in 
practice current income and annual income measures provide similar pictures of 
the static income distribution, composition of the low income population, income 
distribution amongst sub-groups, income mobility, and low income transition 
rates (René Boheim and Stephen Jenkins 2000). This British result suggests that 
the use of a current income measure, as is employed here, may give empirical 
results little different from annual income. 
There is another reason why current income is favoured over annual 
income in this study. The IS aims to accurately measure weekly income rather 
than annual income. The annual income measure is recorded with much less 
precision than the weekly income measure because of the ranged nature of the 
data. Greater error is also likely because incomes are recalled over the past year 
rather than in the reference week. Because our judgement is that measurement 
error in annual income arising out of ranged data and recall problems is likely to 
impart greater spurious variation than transitory income fluctuations in better 
measured current weekly income, weekly current income is our preferred measure 
for examining child poverty transitions. 
Poverty is typically measured in our paper as having an equivalised 
disposable household income of below 50 per cent of the median. The rationale 
for the 50 per cent line is the practical one of international comparisons. Some 
comparisons require use of a 60 per cent median poverty line and in other cases 60 
per cent is used to assess sensitivity of the conclusions to a different arbitrary 
line.
11 
The following weights were available for use in the study. First, there 
are adult weights. In this case adults were defined in this instance as those over 
                                                           
11 Because the HLFS contains no housing information, sensitivity cannot be examined to inclusion 
and exclusion of housing costs. 16 
the age of 15 in both waves one and two who, as a minimum, complete the HLFS, 
including those with both imputed and non-imputed income. Thus only children 
between 15 and 18 could receive an individual weight. Second, there are synthetic 
household weights constructed out of mean adult weights by household and then 
applied to all residents in the household, including children. 
There are two versions of these synthetic household weights, 
respectively including and excluding imputed income. The version incorporating 
imputed income was used to produce a weighted population median income for 
calculating poverty thresholds. The non-imputed version was used to weight up 
the child and population poverty rates. 
Median income was calculated for each wave using all adults and 
children, including those with imputed household income, who appear in both 
wave one and wave two and weighted using a ”synthetic” household weight. The 
poverty line was taken as 50 per cent and 60 per cent of the population median 
and calculated for each wave. 
Weighting was found to have a fairly minor impact on transitions into 
and out of poverty. However, weights are used as a preferred option on a priori 
grounds. 
Standard errors for the LIS are presented in Appendix B. 
6  Child’s household attrition in the linked 
income supplement 
An issue inevitably raised when using data from any longitudinal 
survey is attrition bias. Attrition can result in non-representative samples. Non-
representative and hence biased estimates of income transitions may result. The 
LIS has a potentially larger problem with attrition compared to explicit 
longitudinal designs, since people who are not located at the physical address at 
the first wave are not chased up in the second wave, as they would be in a true 
longitudinal design. In addition, the priority of the survey is to collect labour 
market rather than income information. This further increases attrition from the 
IS.  
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A summary table of the pooled data in Table 1 shows that of 8464 
potential child poverty transitions in the pooled LIS data set, only 4105 actual 
poverty transitions (48.5 per cent) can be used. The majority of missing 
observations—2666 (31.5 per cent) in total—are lost through income imputation 
in the child’s household in either wave one or wave two or both. These 
observations are not included because the cross-sectional income imputation 
method adds spurious income transitions. 
Other reasons (almost all due to non-HLFS response in wave two) 
account for 1134 of the loss (13.4 per cent), while the remainder—559 (6.6 per 
cent)—is accounted for by the child leaving the geographic address over the 
period. 
Table 1: Imputation and attrition for the pooled LIS data—numbers, row 
percentages, and column percentages 
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Having defined overall poverty as 50 per cent of equivalised median 
household income, we break down the 6214 potential child poverty transitions in 
wave one into a simple two-by-three attrition table (in poverty/not in poverty by 
in poverty/not in poverty/attrition) pooled across the three LIS’s (see Table 2). 
Longitudinal attrition is high. The situation of about a third (33.9 per cent) of 
children whose poverty status is observed via non-imputed household income in 18 
wave one could not be assessed in wave two. In addition, children in poverty in 
wave one are somewhat more likely to suffer attrition (38.5 per cent) than those 
not in poverty in wave one (33.1 per cent). Higher attrition rates for the poor 
generally are also found in overseas longitudinal studies (OECD 2001, p. 43). 
Table 2: Raw pooled LIS, numbers and row percentages of child poverty 
transitions 





































What are the reasons for observed attrition by poverty status? Table 3 
breaks down child’s household attrition by different reasons and compares these 
differences for children in and not in poverty. Those in poverty in wave one are 
slightly more likely to move address and to be in a household where at least one 
person did not respond to the HLFS. 
Table 3: Pooled LIS, row percentages of attrition 
Reasons for 










in poverty and 







38.5 33.1 5.4  33.9 
Of which:         
Imputed income in 
child’s household 
in wave two 
 
14.7 14.9 –0.2  14.9 
Child moved 
address in wave 
two 
 
8.7 6.0 2.7  6.4 
Other (mostly non-
HLFS response in 
wave two) 
15.1 12.2 2.9  12.6  
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Attrition has the potential to bias the transition results. There are upper 
and lower bounds for flows that can be estimated under the polar assumptions that 
either all those children not observed in wave two change poverty state or all 
those children not observed in wave two do not change poverty state. The 
maximum bounds for transition rates into and out of poverty are unsurprisingly 
high. We do not know if the point estimates where children are observed in both 
wave one and wave two are biased upwards or downward within these bounds 
and, if so, by how much. 
To investigate this further we turn to a modelling approach. We 
estimate probit regressions on the likelihood of being missing in the second wave 
for both the poor and non-poor children and on the likelihood of exiting and 
entering poverty. A variety of wave one household variables are used as 
explanatory variables. We can observe how the probability of exiting (entering) 
poverty changes as the probability of leaving the sample due to attrition increases. 
The poverty exit (entry) probability can then be inferred from this information for 
those children who actually suffer attrition.
12 Information on “predicted” poverty 
entry rates (the ratio of the number of children entering poverty between waves 
one and two to the number of children not in poverty in wave one) and exit rates 
(the ratio of number of children who exit poverty between waves one and two to 
the numbers of children in poverty in wave one) for attritors can be combined 
with the actual entry and exit rates of non-attritors to give a “best guess” of overall 
transition rates. 
The results of the modelling exercise are shown in Table 4. There are 
two modelling estimates for 1999/2000, where cross-sectional weights were 
                                                           
12 An alternative source of information is available to check for attrition biases. Our problem is 
that we don't know what happens to children observed in the LIS in wave one but who move in 
wave two. However, currently there are children observed in wave two but not observed in wave 
one and thus not currently considered in our study since we observe no transition. However, we 
could assume that children who move out in wave two, conditional on being observed in wave 
one, have similar wave two outcomes to children who move in wave two, conditional on not being 
observed in wave one. We can see if the wave two cross-sectional poverty pattern of those who 
move in differs greatly from the wave one poverty pattern of those who move out. If it were 
greatly different we would be more worried about attrition bias. The advantage of using movers in 
the form of arrivers to tell us something about leavers is that the fact of their movement means that 
we have taken into consideration unobserved variables associated with moving. For resource 
reasons, this method was not explored. It is not, in addition, unproblematic. Children who move in 
may be very different from those who move out. 20 
available. No cross-sectional weights were available for other years. The results 
suggest that the “best guesses” of poverty entry and exit rates are little different 
and not systematically different from the point estimates of transition rates on the 
complete data. We conclude that the evidence suggests that attrition bias is not 
likely to significantly impact on our results. 
That said, we believe that further work on attrition in the LIS could be 
of considerable value in establishing a sound basis for future work on the data set. 
Table 4: Modelling child poverty entry and exit rates to allow for attrition 
biases 
  Actual poverty exit 
rate  
Modelled exit rate of 
children in 
households suffering 
attrition in wavetwo 
“Best guess” 
poverty exit rate 
1997/1998 53.6  53.6  53.6 
1998/1999 64.5  60.0  62.1 
1999/2000 
   unweighted 










 Actual  poverty 
entry rate 
Modelled entry rate 
of children in 
households suffering 
attrition in wave two 
“Best guess” 
poverty entry rate 
1997/1998 7.9  9.1  8.4 
1998/1999 9.4  10.3  9.8 
1999/2000 
   unweighted 










7  Child and adult poverty and poverty 
dynamics in the linked income supplement 
This section compares child poverty rates and child poverty dynamics 
with those of the adult population. The main sensitivity explored is to differences 
in the poverty line. We considered making benchmark comparisons with other 
New Zealand research on child poverty dynamics but the differences in data along 
many dimensions were sufficiently great to persuade us the task was unrewarding. 
Table 5 shows that slightly less than one in eight children are in 
poverty, measured as less than 50 per cent of median disposable income. Child 
poverty rises markedly to almost one in four children when the chosen poverty 
line is 60 per cent of median income. The chances of an adult being observed in 
poverty are always lower than for children, regardless of the chosen poverty line.  
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Children are more likely to be in poverty than are adults in New Zealand. This 
pattern, familiar from the overseas literature, is replicated elsewhere regardless of 
the definition of poverty. 
It is likely that the higher rate of child poverty is driven off some 
combination of four factors. First, almost by definition, children typically provide 
no income for the numerator of household equivalised income but contribute to 
the hungry mouths in the denominator. Second, parents have children earlier in 
the earnings life cycle, and parental incomes have yet to peak. Third, having 
children has implications for (typically) female labour supply and thus this lowers 
labour market earnings of the household as someone stays at home to provide 
non-market income in terms of childcare. Fourthly, poor people may have more 
children. 
Table 5: Cross-sectional rates of child poverty compared with adult poverty 
 Wave  one 
50 per cent of 
median 
Wave two 
50 per cent of 
median 
Wave one  
60 per cent of 
median 
Wave two  
60 per cent of 
median 
Children  13.1 12.6 23.2 22.8 
Adults  9.4 8.8 17.2  16.4 
 
Poverty experiences over a year are explored for adults and children in 
Table 62. The never poor are those who are not below the poverty line in either 
wave one or wave two. Those that enter poverty are not poor in wave one but are 
poor in wave two. Those that exit poverty are poor in wave one but not poor in 
wave two. As a percentage of the population the four groups sum to one hundred. 
Where poverty is measured as below 50 per cent of median income, 
over one in five children have at least one poverty experience compared to one in 
six adults. For poverty defined as less than 60 per cent of the median, children 
remain more likely to experience poverty at least once, with the figure of about 
one in three compared to one in four adults. 
With either poverty measure, the chances of children being always in 
poverty are nearly double that of adults. Thus child poverty is not only higher than 
adult poverty regardless of where the poverty line is drawn, it is also more 
persistent. 22 
Table 6: Poverty experiences across the two waves for children compared 
to adults 
Children  Never Enter Exit  Always 
50% of median  78.0  7.5  8.0  6.6 
60% of median  65.1  8.7  9.7  16.5 
       
Adults  Never Enter Exit  Always 
50% of median  84.5  5.5  6.2  3.8 
60% of median  72.4  7.9  9.9  9.8 
 
Table 7 considers flows back and forwards across various poverty lines. 
Chances of exiting poverty are higher for adults than children, but lower in both 
cases for the more encompassing 60 per cent of median income poverty line. 
Chances of entering poverty are higher for children than for adults and higher for 
the more encompassing 60 per cent of median income poverty line. Mobility is a 
two-edged sword. High immobility ensures that those who are poor are stuck and 
have a relatively intense experience of poverty. On the other hand increasing 
mobility, while ensuring poverty is more evenly shared across the population, 
increases total exposure to poverty. 
Table 7: Poverty entry and exit rates across the two waves for children 
compared to adults 
Children  Poverty exit rate  Poverty entry rate 
50% of median  58.5  8.2 
60% of median  38.5  11.1 
   
Adults  Poverty exit rate  Poverty entry rate 
50% of median  61.2  5.7 
60% of median  48.2  9.1 
8  International comparisons of child poverty 
transitions 
This section presents a cross-national perspective on child poverty 
dynamics. It utilises the information on child poverty dynamics in five countries 
provided by Bradbury, Jenkins and Micklewright (2001c). New Zealand mobility, 
extracted and pooled from the LIS for New Zealand for three waves, 1997/98, 
1998/99, and 1999/00, is compared to mobility in the five countries (Britain, 
Germany/West Germany, Hungary, Russia, and Spain) where a current net after-
tax income measure is available.  
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Basic data for the different surveys are summarised in Table 8. In all 
cases the child is the unit of analysis and children are attributed disposable 
household income equivalised by the square root of household size. Noteworthy is 
the relatively large size of the New  Zealand data set in terms of numbers of 
households with children in two waves, similar to that of Germany and 
significantly smaller only than Spain. Also noteworthy is the comparatively high 
proportion of children in the New Zealand sample, partly reflecting our younger 
average age and perhaps also the address-based nature of the data set. 
Only in the case of New  Zealand and Britain is income measured 
weekly. In the other cases current income is measured monthly. Additionally, as 
already noted, the Spanish data source is a very similar residence-based eight-
quarter rotating panel to the LIS, but collects income information quarterly using a 
monthly income accounting period, as well as expenditure information. 
Are there large differences in mobility for a given country when 
different time periods are used for income measurement? Are these patterns 
systematic across countries? Using gross annual income as opposed to a monthly 
or weekly net measure of current income to examine transitions between child 
distribution deciles gives a slightly lower mobility measure for Britain (2.9 
percentage points lower, with the mobility measure being the off-diagonal 
component on a decile-based income transition matrix). The results for Germany 
are similar (0.5 percentage points lower). However, higher mobility is found for 
Hungary (by 4.0 percentage points). 
Thus overseas evidence does suggest that differences in income 
accounting periods are not particularly important for broad mobility patterns. 
Given differences in ways of measuring income between New Zealand and other 
countries, this result is of some comfort in terms of broad accuracy of the 
comparisons and contrasts which will be drawn below. We may not be comparing 
lemons and lemons, but we are comparing lemons and limes. 24 
Table 8: The surveys 
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Table 9 presents the basic cross-country facts on child poverty. 
Compared to the continental European countries, New Zealand has a relatively 
high child poverty rate and New Zealand children have a low median income in 
comparison to the population. New Zealand’s outcomes look broadly most similar 
to those of Britain.  
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Table 9: Inequality and poverty 
Country  Child median ÷ 
population 
median 
Child poverty rate 
(half median 
poverty line) 
Increase in child 
poverty waves t-1 to 
t (percentage 
points) 
Britain 0.89  16.8  0.5 
Germany 0.95  7.7  –0.6 
West Germany  0.94  6.8  –0.8 
Hungary 0.97  9.7  3.5 
Russia 0.94  24.1  5.2 
Spain 0.92  11.9  –1.9 
New Zealand  0.90  12.6  1.7 
Notes: The income measure used is current net income. All incomes are adjusted by the ‘square 
root of household size’ equivalence scale. Child median and poverty rates are for children in two 
waves. The population median is calculated for all persons. 
Source: Britain, Germany, West Germany, Hungary, Russia and Spain: Bradbury, Jenkins and 
Micklewright (June 2001c) “Child Poverty Dynamics in Seven Nations”. 
Now consider the degree of churning in the income distribution. One 
popular measure of churning throughout the distribution is the extent to which 
children shift between income deciles. In effect, the mobility measure is the off-
diagonal component in an income transition matrix.  Table 10 shows that income 
mobility of children is at the higher end in New  Zealand relative to overseas 
benchmarks, with the exception of Russia, which is found to be a strong outlier in 
the group in terms of income mobility across most measures. Over two-thirds of 
New  Zealand children change their income decile over a year. There is a 
reasonable amount of household income churning for children in New Zealand. 
Table 10: The income mobility of children 
Country  Percentage of children in a different decile group of the 






West Germany  59.4 
New Zealand  66.6 
Note: The income measure used is current net income. 
Having established that general income mobility of New  Zealand 
children is at the higher end, mobility out of and into relatively low income—
defined here as the bottom fifth of the child income distribution—is now 
considered (see Table 11). 26 
Do the same mobility conclusions hold if the focus is on the bottom end 
of the income distribution? The answer is yes. Again, with the exception of 
Russia, New Zealand appears to have a relatively high degree of mobility across a 
low income threshold. On average about 12 per cent of New Zealand children are 
in the bottom fifth of the child household income distribution for two consecutive 
years, whereas the European countries have somewhat higher figures. Russia is 
the low outlier, with about nine per cent of children in poverty for two out of two 
waves. 
The flip side of relatively high levels of mobility is that a somewhat 
greater proportion of New  Zealand children have at least one experience of 
poverty over a two-wave period. Again Russia is the exception for Europe, with 
exposure rates very similar to New Zealand. 
Table 11: Low income persistence of children 
Percentage of children always 
in the bottom fifth 
Percentage of children ever in 
the bottom fifth 
 
In one wave




a  In at least one 
wave 
Britain 19.7 14.1 19.7  27.2 
Germany  20.1 13.4 20.1  26.5 
West  Germany  20.0 14.1 20.0  25.0 
Hungary  19.8 13.1 19.8  26.5 
Russia 20.0  8.5  20.0  31.3 
Spain  20.0 13.3 20.0  26.8 
New  Zealand  19.9 11.6 19.9  28.2 
Note: The income measure used is current net income. 
 
aPercentages differ from 20 per cent because of the application of longitudinal weights to a cross-
section from a longitudinal sample. In one wave refers to the most recent wave. 
Another way of considering churning is to examine the extent to which 
middle income or middle class families fall into the bottom fifth. Defining middle 
income as the middle fifth of the distribution, Table 12 shows that nearly one in 
ten New Zealand middle income children will fall into the bottom fifth of the 
distribution the following year. This is nearly twice the chance of a middle income 
child in Britain, for example, falling into the bottom fifth. As has become familiar, 
Russia is the outlier, with high numbers of middle income children downward 
bound.  
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Table 12: Middle class entry to low income: falling down the ladder 
Country  Percentage of children in the middle fifth 
falling into the poorest fifth 
Between years t-1 and t 
Britain 4.7 
Germany 4.7 




New Zealand  9.1 
Note: The income measure used is current net income. 
Moving away from quintiles as a means of subdividing the distribution, 
consider mobility into and out of child poverty, with poverty defined as below  
50 per cent of median income. Table 13 shows New Zealand has a poverty entry 
rate around that of Britain, after the Russian aberration, and the highest poverty 
exit rate. Almost one in ten non-poor New Zealand children falls into poverty, 
while the chances of exiting poverty year on year exceed a half. Thus at the 
bottom end of the distribution New Zealand exhibits a high degree of churning 
relative to other countries. 
Table 13: Child poverty entry rates and exit rates 
Country  Entry rate (%)  Exit rate (%) 
Russia 17.9  49.5 
Britain 8.0  38.0 
Spain 5.0  44.8 
Hungary 5.3  25.1 
Germany 3.9  51.8 
West Germany  2.7  43.2 
New Zealand  8.2  58.5 
Note: The income measure used is current net income. The entry and exit rates refer to movements 
into and out of poverty between year t-1 and year t. Countries are sorted within each income 
definition in descending order of the child poverty rate. 
Now consider poverty persistence, shown in Table 14. The first column 
is a repeat of the second column in Table 9: the wave one cross-sectional 
distribution of child poverty. With 5.4 per cent of New  Zealand children 
remaining in poverty in two of two waves, New Zealand fits in the middle of the 
persistence rankings, below both Britain and Russia but above the continental 
European countries. About one in five New Zealand children experience poverty 
in one of the two waves, slightly below Britain and above the continental 
countries. Russia is the high exception. Thus New Zealand has relatively high 28 
child poverty rates, a medium degree of persistence, and relatively high poverty 
exposure. 
Table 14: Poverty persistence among children 
Percentage of children with 
household income always 
below half median income 
Percentage of children with 
household income ever below 
half median income 
Country 
In one wave  Two out of 
two waves 
In one wave  In at least one 
wave 
Britain 16.8 10.1 16.8 22.9 
Germany  7.7 4.1 7.7 11.9 
West  Germany  6.8 4.3 6.8 10.0 
Hungary  9.7 4.6 9.7 11.2 
Russia  24.1 9.6  24.1 33.5 
Spain  11.9 7.6  11.9 18.1 
New  Zealand  12.6 5.4  12.6 20.2 
Note: The income measure used is current net income. 
Where do those entering and exiting poverty come from and go to? 
Table 15 addresses these issues. In terms of small movers across the boundary in 
either direction, New Zealand has relatively few small “boundary hoppers” into 
poverty—in other words, much of New  Zealand’s downward child mobility 
appears to be genuine mobility compared to other countries. Russia as ever is the 
exception. New Zealand’s share of poverty exits moving from just below to just 
above the poverty line is small. Again, New Zealand seems to have a relatively 
high proportion of big movers into and out of poverty. 
Table 15: Entry from and exit to “near poverty” 






Share of entries 
coming from 
“near poverty” 
and going to 
“just below the 
line” (%) 










the line” (%) 
Russia  10.4 3.5  19.9 6.7 
Britain  57.2 40.3  43.9 20.7 
Spain 38.1 22.4  36.9 17.1 
Hungary  56.6 48.4  33.8 23.0 
Germany  53.7 36.2  37.3 30.7 
West  Germany  39.1 26.1  29.5 27.2 
New  Zealand  42.0 24.0  38.9 14.8 
Note: The income measure used is current net income. “Near poverty” is defined as income in the 
range 50–60 per cent of the median; “just below the line” is defined as income in the range 40–50 
per cent of the median.  
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Overall New Zealand mobility patterns are broadly consistent with the 
comparative overseas work on mobility of children into and out of poverty on a 
year-on-year basis. This makes us more confident about assuming other broad 
overseas patterns of multi-year persistence of child poverty are likely to hold in 
the New Zealand environment. 
The New Zealand picture of child poverty and child poverty dynamics 
most closely approximates Britain. This may be because of the income measure—
Britain is the only other country where weekly data is available—or because the 
two countries truly are most similar. 
Generally it seems that mobility of children into and out of poverty in 
New Zealand is reasonably high, as also is our cross-sectional child poverty rate. 
At the same time as comparisons suggest New  Zealand has quite high child 
poverty mobility, there is also an economically and socially significant amount of 
poverty persistence. The stock of poor children is far from turning over annually. 
An issue arises regarding whether it is the data set—in particular the 
weekly measure of current income used here—that is generating these results. We 
do not believe that it is the data generating the results. British mobility, like 
New  Zealand mobility, is examined using a weekly current income measure. 
Equally, the Spanish data set is collected using a very similar method to 
New Zealand. Finally, given the result mentioned earlier that different income 
measures for the same country generate similar patterns of results within that 
country, we are confident that our results are broadly reliable. 
9  Trigger events and child poverty 
transitions 
This section uses information on exit and entry rates from child poverty 
and concurrent events that might be thought to “trigger” the entry or exit. 
The framework used here is outlined in Jenkins and Schluter (2001). It 
involves consideration of entry and exit rates for two different sorts of households 
observed in the first wave—lone parents and couples. Trigger events are 
considered which may push children’s households into and out of poverty. 
Probabilities of entry and exit are considered conditional on the chances of 30 
experiencing certain trigger events and these are compared to the overall 
likelihood of entry and exit. 
The trigger events are changes in the number of workers in a child’s 
household, changes in a child’s household earnings (holding the number of 
workers fixed), movements into and out of a single adult household, and changes 
in the number of household members (holding household type fixed). 
The advantage of this approach is that the New  Zealand results on 
frequency of trigger events and on conditional probabilities of experiencing 
transitions can be compared with the West German and British information 
provided by Jenkins and Schluter (2001). The cross-country information is of 
great interest, since it provides some information on whether it is differences in 
the “impulse” shocks or in the “propagation mechanisms” through which shocks 
influence outcomes (to use Ragnar Frisch’s fruitful business cycle terminology) or 
both across countries that drives observed cross-country differences. 
The data sources for both Britain and West Germany are true 
longitudinal surveys, whereas the New Zealand data set is not. This difference 
should be borne in mind in what follows below, especially in terms of differences 
in trigger event frequencies. 
Jenkins and Schluter (2001) use their results to argue that the 
differences between Britain and Germany are due to differences in propagation 
mechanisms that reflect broad cross-country differences in social policies. They 
argue that cross-country differences in labour or marriage market institutions will 
be primarily revealed through differences in frequencies of trigger events. On the 
other hand, they suggest that differences in the nature of welfare states will be 
reflected in differences in conditional transition probabilities. This paper takes a 
somewhat more agnostic line to using such information to draw inferences about 
differences in nature of welfare states. 
Basic cross-country comparisons are shown in Table 16. The poverty 
line is now 60 per cent of median disposable income, since this is what is used in 
Jenkins and Schluter. New Zealand has a total cross-sectional child poverty rate 
between that of West Germany and Britain. However, New Zealand’s lone parent 
poverty rate is indistinguishable from that in West Germany, which in turn is  
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lower than that experienced in Britain. New Zealand’s couple household child 
poverty rate is similar to Britain and West Germany. 
New Zealand has the highest exit rate of child poverty. This high exit 
ranking is due primarily to high exit rates for couple households, since 
New Zealand’s exit rate for lone parent households is between Britain’s and West 
Germany’s. New  Zealand also has British-like entry rates for both types of 
household. 
New Zealand generates a lower relative probability of exit from poverty 
for lone parent households relative to couple households compared to Britain and 
West Germany. The chance of exit for a child in a lone parent household in 
New  Zealand is about half the exit chances of a child in a couple household, 
whereas for Britain it is much rosier—more like two thirds. In turn Germany does 
even better—the chances of a child in a lone parent household exiting poverty are 
over 90 per cent of the chances of a poor child in a couple household. 
What stands out is the relatively disadvantaged exit position of children 
in lone parent households compared to couple households in New  Zealand. A 
similar but not as pronounced pattern of relative disadvantage for New Zealand 
lone parents is found for child poverty entry rates. 
Table 16: Annual poverty rates and poverty exit and entry rates for children 
for New Zealand compared to Britain and West Germany 
  Poverty rate in wave 
one 
Exit rate  Entry rate 


















47.0  68.1 49.1  25.2  20.4 33.4 23.5  24.9 17.1 
Couple 
household 
17.7 22.4  16.3 46.3 27.3  36.2  8.2  9.9 6.4 
Source for the United Kingdom and West Germany: Jenkins and Schluter (2001). 
The British and West German data used is eight waves of survey data over the 1991–1998 period. 
New Zealand data is pooled data for the three LIS’s: 1997/98, 1998/99, 1999/2000. 
The poverty line used is 60% of median income because that is the measure used in Jenkins and 
Schluter (2001) to calculate poverty in the UK and West German y. 
Jenkins and Schluter (2001) equivalise using a weighted average of children and adults present in 
the household. They show their results are not sensitive to different equivalisation weights. 32 
Trigger events and conditional poverty exits are examined separately 
for lone parents and couples in turn. The separate consideration of lone parents 
and couples has a number of justifications. The first is that as a consequence of 
the type of household, lone parents potentially experience different events from a 
couple household—for example, re-partnering from a sole parent situation. The 
second major reason for separation is that labour supply behaviour of lone parents 
is likely to be different from couple households because of less potential for 
shared childcare or a household division of labour in childcare. 
Trigger events considered for lone parents include the demographic 
events of a fall in household size (for example, either an older sibling leaving or 
possibly exit of the custodial parent), and exiting a lone parent household (re-
partnering). In addition there are the labour market events of gaining full-time 
work and experiencing an increase in labour market earnings with the number of 
workers unchanged. Finally a combined event—leaving a lone parent household 
and gaining a full-time worker—is considered. 
Trigger events are not mutually exclusive, although they are examined 
as if they were. It is possible that a child experiences a fall in household size while 
exiting a lone parent household, gaining a full-time worker and getting a 20 per 
cent or more increase in labour earnings. 
The rise in labour earnings considered here is not a pure price effect, 
since it does not control for hours worked for a given level of household 
employment. Thus for many children’s households experiencing such a shock, 
parental hours of work may increase to raise labour earnings. 
Consider first poverty exits for lone parents for the three countries. The 
first line in Table 17 presents the baseline rates of exit for all children of lone 
parent households in poverty. Chances of exit in New  Zealand are about one 
quarter, between a high of one third in West Germany and one fifth in Britain. 
There are cross-national differences in the chances of trigger events 
occurring. In New Zealand 12 per cent of lone parent households fell in size. The 
numbers for the two other countries were negligible. 
It is likely that this finding is a data artefact. Many of these observed 
falls in household size in New Zealand may have been because of the temporary  
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absence of people from the household during the reference week because of 
holidays and so on. In addition, since the New Zealand sample includes a larger 
share of children than the other two samples, there will be more older children 
leaving home for study or for employment elsewhere. 
Compared to Britain (17 per cent) and Germany (13 per cent), 
New Zealand lone parents have a lower chance of re-partnering (11 per cent). On 
the other hand, in terms of the labour market generating lone parent jobs, 
New Zealand (11 per cent) sits between Britain, where lone parents have a 9 per 
cent chance of getting full-time work, and West Germany, where odds of finding 
full-time work, at about 15 per cent, are higher. But the joint probabilities of re-
partnering and gaining a full-time worker (either through changes in the initial 
lone parent’s labour supply or because the new partner has or gets a job) are very 
similar across the three countries in the comparison. 
There are very large differences between New Zealand and the other 
two countries in terms of the chances of having a 20 per cent or more increase in 
labour earnings with the number of employed people in the household held 
constant. In New Zealand the chances of this happening are a modest 8 per cent, 
while in Britain it is experienced by two-thirds and in West Germany by half of 
lone parents. Regarding the Britain/West Germany comparison, Jenkins and 
Schluter (2001, p. 17) conclude that “it appears, in both countries, increases in 
annual work hours (for already working households) are more common amongst 
poor lone parent households than are moves into full-time work”. 
There is a puzzle here. It may be that in West Germany and Britain 
many lone parent households experience increases in hours worked from a low 
base that do not take them over a full-time threshold. It may also be the case that 
the differences are generated by different data sets. 34 
Table 17: Poverty exits by poor children in lone parent households for 
New Zealand compared to Britain and West Germany (pooled data 
1997/98, 1998/99, 1999/2000) 
Event Percent 
 New  Zealand  Britain  West 
Germany 
All children at t-1 at risk of poverty 
exit 
    
Pr(not poor at t)  25.2  20.4  33.4 
Household size fell       
Pr(event) 12.4  1.3  0.0 
Pr(not poor at t/event)  19.5  3.1  _ 
Left lone parent household       
Pr(event) 10.3  17.0  12.6 
Pr(not poor at t/event)  28.6  46.0  48.8 
Gained one or more full-time workers       
Pr(event) 10.5  8.9  14.6 
Pr(not poor at t/event)  61.6  74.1  82.2 
Both of above       
Pr(event) 5.7  6.0  5.3 
Pr(not poor at t/event)  51.8  83.5  91.7 
Labour earnings increased by 20% or 
more (number of workers unchanged) 
    
Pr(event) 6.3  65.2  50.0 
Pr(not poor at t/event)  26.3  11.1  32.3 
 
Now consider the comparative probabilities of exit conditional on 
experiencing a trigger event. 
Leaving a lone parent household raises the probability of a 
New Zealand child exiting poverty marginally above the baseline. However, the 
effects are much stronger in Britain and West Germany, where exit chances on 
household re-partnering are nearer to one-half. Given the baseline is a fifth for 
Britain and one-third for West Germany, the differential impact of re-partnering 
relative to baseline exit rates is strongest in Britain. 
Gaining a full-time worker is very good for raising child poverty exit 
chances in all three countries, but the chances, at 62 per cent, are lowest in 
New  Zealand, with British chances a solid three-quarters and West German 
chances in excess of eighty percent. 
Experiencing the combined event of exit from lone parenting and 
gaining one or more workers reveals a similar ranking. While the event nearly  
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guarantees exit in the cases of West Germany and Britain, the chances of leaving 
poverty for New Zealand children of lone parents are only a half. 
Gaining a 20 per cent or more increase in labour earnings doesn’t raise 
exit chances in New Zealand. The German result is similar. In Britain the chances 
of exit on this event are actually lower than the baseline exit rate. 
Now consider cross-country comparisons of poverty exits for couple 
households. The information is contained in Table 18. 
Overall children in couple households are most likely to exit poverty in 
New  Zealand with chances of nearly one-half compared to a little over one-
quarter and a third for Britain and West Germany respectively. The poverty exit 
chances for couple households are higher in all three countries than poverty exit 
rates for children from lone parent households. 
Consider first the different probabilities of trigger events across the 
three countries. Again, probably because the data is a non-longitudinal design, 
falls in household size are more common in New Zealand compared to the other 
two countries. The chances of gaining a worker are a little under a third in 
New Zealand, much higher than the one in five chance in Britain and the 15 per 
cent chance in West Germany. Equally the chances of gaining a fulltime worker 
follow the same ordering, with a one in five chance of the event in New Zealand 
compared to 15 per cent and 10 per cent for Britain and West Germany 
respectively. 
Again, an increase in labour earnings is least likely in New Zealand. 
The event happens to less than one in five children in poor couple households. 
The chances of such an event are more than twice as high in Britain and about 
almost twice as high in West Germany. While the country differences in event 
frequency are quite disproportionate for New Zealand, they are nowhere near as 
disproportionate as the same event frequency for children in poor lone parent 
households. 
Decreases in household size, experienced by a small 7 per cent of poor 
children in New Zealand couple households, have a two-thirds chance of poverty 
exit, whereas the events are very rare for Britain and West Germany. 36 
Gaining a worker raises chances of a child poverty exit in New Zealand 
to 65 per cent while gaining a full-time worker is even better—an over 80 per cent 
chance of exit. Relative to both the lone parent situation in New Zealand and to 
conditions in Britain and West Germany, gaining a worker in New Zealand has a 
much stronger impact on child poverty exit in a couple household. Chances for 
exit conditional on the same event in Britain and West Germany are bunched at 
around one half. 
Gaining an economically significant rise in labour earnings gives a 
chance of poverty exit of 71 per cent in New  Zealand, comparable to West 
Germany at around 63 per cent, but over double that of Britain, where the chances 
of exit are no more than the baseline exit rate. 
Overall New Zealand is much more successful in generating jobs for 
poor couple households with children than West Germany and Britain. 
New Zealand is less successful than both Britain and West Germany in translating 
positive events for lone parent families, like re-partnering and gaining a full-time 
worker, into a child poverty exit, despite roughly similar cross-country rates of 
experience of these main trigger events. 
On the other hand, New Zealand appears to be more efficient compared 
to Britain and West Germany in translating labour market events like gaining a 
full-time worker and experiencing an economically significant rise in labour 
earnings into poverty exits for poor children in couple households. This is despite 
the fact that such an event is less frequent in New Zealand. 
New Zealand’s relative success in generating poverty exits for children 
in couple households compared to children in lone parent households follows 
from these facts. 
There are also some commonalities between poor children in lone 
parent and couple households in New Zealand. In the one case of an ability to 
translate an economically significant rise in labour earnings into a poverty exit, 
New Zealand appears more efficient than either Britain or West Germany for both 
child household types.  
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Table 18: Poverty exits by poor children in couple households children for 
New Zealand compared to Britain and West Germany (pooled data 
1997/98, 1998/99, 1999/2000) 
Event  Percent 




All children at t-1 at risk of poverty exit       
Pr(not poor at t)  47.0  27.3  36.2 
Household size fell       
Pr(event) 8.1  1.7  2.2 
Pr(not poor at t/event)  81.8  34.2  37.9 
Gained one or more workers       
Pr(event) 29.0  20.1  15.1 
Pr(not poor at t/event)  65.3  41.0  50.0 
Gained one or more full-time workers       
Pr(event) 20.7  15.4  10.9 
Pr(not poor at t/event)  80.7  50.0  56.5 
Labour earnings increased by 20% or 
more (number of workers unchanged) 
    
Pr(event) 17.4  40.8  32.0 
Pr(not poor at t/event)  70.8  28.3  62.9 
 
Now consider movements into child poverty. Couple households only 
are considered since the sample numbers for non-poor households of other types 
are too small to sustain further analysis. 
Now consider rates for couple households entering poverty. Baseline 
entry rates are fairly similar across countries but lowest in Germany. 
Again trigger events are considered first. Household size rises for about 
one in ten children in New Zealand couple households not in poverty. Odds of this 
happening are about half as large in Britain and West Germany. Again, these 
differences between New Zealand and the other two countries are likely to be 
influenced by the geographic frame within which New Zealand data is collected. 
Risks of becoming a sole parent are small and very similar in 
New Zealand and West Germany. Given the geographic basis of the New Zealand 
data and the likelihood that in many cases becoming a sole parent will be 
associated with a movement in geographic location, couple separations are likely 
to be relatively underestimated in the New Zealand data. 
Experiencing the loss of a worker is most likely in Britain and least 
likely in West Germany. New  Zealand lies in the middle between the two 38 
comparison countries. Similar relative patterns are found for the event of losing a 
full-time worker. 
The probability of experiencing the twin events of becoming a lone 
parent household and a worker is low, for all countries lying between one and two 
percent. 
In terms of entry into poverty, country rankings of the chances of 
experiencing a significant fall in labour earnings for a couple household are quite 
different from country rankings for experiencing a significant rise in labour 
earnings for lone parent and couple households in poverty. Children in 
New Zealand couple households who are not in poverty have a one in five chance 
of experiencing this event, much higher than chances in either Britain or Germany 
(in both cases a less than one in ten chance). 
Finally, the chances of children in non-poor families experiencing the 
shock of a newborn child are nearly twice as high in New Zealand as in Britain, 
where the chances are in turn nearly four times higher than in West Germany. The 
reason for the large West German–British difference is due to the different nature 
of the two surveys (Jenkins and Schluter 2001, p. 21, fn 15). The geographical 
basis of the New Zealand data set and the fact that families about to have children 
are less likely to be geographically mobile is likely to be driving at least some of 
this New Zealand–British difference. 
Now consider conditional probabilities of children from couple 
households entering poverty. 
Household size increases have small impacts in pushing the chances of 
children in couple households falling into poverty above baseline, except for 
Britain, where chances rise to double baseline chances. 
While joining a lone parent household is a comparatively rare event, it 
leads to a big increase in all three countries in probabilities of falling into poverty 
compared to the baseline chances. However, the chances of a split making a child 
downward bound into poverty are the lowest in New Zealand. 
Again, the experience of losing one or more workers—or one or more 
full-time workers—generates very similar cross-country chances of children in  
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couple households falling into poverty in all three countries, with the chances 
lurking between one in four and one in five. 
While significant falls in labour earnings are most likely in 
New Zealand, the chances of this throwing children in couple households into 
poverty is at baseline. On the other had it is much more likely to throw into 
poverty both British children—with a chance of over one in four—and West 
German children, with a chance of about one in five. 
Finally, having a newborn in Britain and West Germany substantially 
increases the chances of children in couple households falling into poverty—in 
both cases the odds are over one quarter. The event is less traumatic in 
New Zealand, with the odds only a little above baseline. 
Table 19: Poverty entry by non-poor children in couple households children 
for New Zealand compared to Britain and West Germany (pooled 
data 1997/98, 1998/99, 1999/2000) 
Event  Percent 
  New Zealand  Britain  West 
Germany 
All children at t-1 at risk of poverty 
entry 
    
Pr(poor at t)  8.2  9.9  6.4 
Household size rose       
Pr(event) 9.5  6.0  4.8 
Pr(poor at t/event)  8.2  18.0  9.0 
Joined lone parent household       
Pr(event) 1.8  3.2  1.6 
Pr(poor at t/event)  43.7  61.8  58.9 
Lost one or more workers       
Pr(event) 13.9  18.0  8.7 
Pr(poor at t/event)  21.4  23.0  20.0 
Both of the above       
Pr(event) 1.6  1.9  1.4 
Pr(poor at t/event)  49.4  64.7  65.1 
Lost one or more full-time workers       
Pr(event) 10.4  17.0  8.3 
Pr(poor at t/event)  20.5  22.0  21.5 
Labour earnings fell by 20% or more 
(number of workers unchanged) 
    
Pr(event) 18.7  8.4  8.0 
Pr(poor at t/event)  8.8  27.7  19.3 
New born child at t       
Pr(event) 7.5  4.3  1.0 
Pr(poor at t/event)  9.5  27.2  25.9 
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The overall impression of the inter-country comparisons of 
New Zealand, West Germany and Britain is that there is more variation in event 
probabilities—“trigger events”—than in transition probabilities conditional on 
experiencing the trigger event. This conclusion was arrived at semi-formally. 
There were 16 cases across the three tables where coefficients of variation 
(standard deviation divided by mean) could be calculated across the three 
countries for the trigger events as well as the transition probabilities and the two 
coefficients of variation compared for trigger events versus transition 
probabilities. In 12 out of the 16 cases (75 percent) country variation in 
experience of trigger events exceeded country variation in transition probabilities. 
This three-country conclusion appears somewhat at odds with the two 
country conclusion of Jenkins and Schluter (2001). Jenkins and Schluter 
(2001, p. 23) sum up: 
We have used a form of decomposition analysis, comparing cross-
nationally the prevalence of events that trigger poverty…and the 
chances of making a poverty transition conditional on experiencing 
a trigger event. It turns out that it is the latter type of difference that 
is the most important for [differences between West German and 
British] poverty exits and poverty entries…these findings reflect 
differences between the German and British welfare states, in 
particular the German one providing a greater cushion against 
adverse events and better reinforcement of positive events. 
Differences in the prevalence of trigger events do, of course, play a 
role; a notable example being the greater risk of job loss in Britain 
compared to Western Germany. 
There are a number of possible reasons for the difference in the 
findings. First and most obviously, this study adds another country observation to 
the mix. Second, Jenkins and Schluter examine shocks and transitions over a 
multi-year window, not simply the annual window examined here (which of 
course is a consequence of the fact that the New  Zealand data only allows 
examination of a one-year window). A third possible reason is that the differences 
in the ways data is collected in the three countries has a greater influence on the 
observed prevalence of trigger events than on the transitional probabilities of 
exits. For example, it is clear that the address-based nature of data collection and 
the fact that data collection is based on the narrow window of the reference week 
in New Zealand will mean more changes in the number of people observed in the  
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household. It is less obvious that this data collection method will lead to as much 
variation in transition probabilities. 
Another way of considering the data which generates some insights is 
to look at the percentage of those exiting poverty who had a particular trigger 
event associated with that exit. This provides an indication of the relative 
importance of trigger events in association with exits or entries. The events will 
not sum to a hundred percent, since there will be exits not associated with trigger 
events and, in addition, the events are not mutually exclusive. This method 
provides some information on comparing one country with a low event prevalence 
but a high exit probability with another with a high event prevalence but a low 
exit probability. The information is provided in Tables 20–22. 
These tables show that, for New Zealand, child poverty exiters are more 
likely to “take” a positive labour market event with them than a positive 
demographic event. 
Over a quarter of children exiting poverty from a lone parent family 
take the gain of a fulltime worker, compared to somewhat less than a third in 
Britain and Germany. Only 14 per cent of children in lone parent New Zealand 
families leave with their parent having re-partnered, whereas 38 per cent of British 
exits are re-partners. The biggest single event in Britain associated with poverty 
exit for children of lone parents is a marriage market event not a labour market 
event (see Table 20). West Germany is more like New Zealand, with the marriage 
market event being less important and the labour market events being more 
common. 
Nearly one-half of child poverty exits from coupled households are 
associated with the gain of a worker in New Zealand, much higher than the one-
third in Britain and the one-fifth in Germany. On the other hand, over half of 
children in poor couple households in Germany who leave poverty are in 
households experiencing a significant rise in labour earnings, compared to only 
one-quarter in New Zealand (Table 21). 42 
Table 20: Share of poverty exits (%) of poor children in lone parent 
households children who experienced the trigger event for 
New Zealand compared to Britain and West Germany 
Event  Percent 
  New Zealand  Britain  West 
Germany 
Household size fell  9.1  0.2  0.0 
Left lone parent household  11.8  38.3  18.4 
Gained one or more full-time workers  25.7  32.3  35.9 
Both of the above  11.8  24.6  14.6 
Labour earnings increased by 20% or 









Table 21: Share of poverty exits (%) of poor children in couple households 
children who experienced the trigger event for New Zealand 
compared to Britain and West Germany 
Event  Percent 
 New  Zealand  Britain  West 
Germany 
Household size fell  14.4  2.1  2.3 
Gained one or more workers  41.0  30.2  20.9 
Gained one or more full-time workers  36.1  28.2  17.0 
Labour earnings increased by 20% or 









Finally consider the relative importance of trigger events in association 
with exits or entries (shown in Table 21). Fully one in five British children in 
couple households who fall into poverty have parental separation associated with 
them, compared to one in seven in Germany and less than 10 per cent in 
New  Zealand. Again, more children “take” adverse labour market events with 
them when they fall into poverty than take adverse marriage market events—with 
New  Zealand being particularly pronounced in this regard—or demographic 
events (arrival of a newborn).  
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Table 22: Share of poverty entries (%) of non-poor children in couple 
households children who experienced the trigger event for 
New Zealand compared to Britain and West Germany 
Event  Percent 
 New  Zealand  Britain  West 
Germany 
Household size rose  9.6  10.9  6.8 
Joined a lone parent household  9.6  20.0  14.7 
Lost one or more workers  36.3  41.8  27.2 
Both of the above  9.5  12.4  14.2 
Lost one or more full-time workers  26.1  37.8  27.9 
Labour earnings increased by 20% or 








Newborn child  8.7  11.8  4.0 
 
In summary, the trigger events analysis presented above emphasises the 
importance of labour market shocks and responses for generating child exits from 
poverty compared to demographic events like changes in household size, new 
births, and re-partnering. Demographic events occur less frequently than labour 
market events in all three countries. In addition in New Zealand, West Germany 
and Britain, unlike Canada (see Picot, Zyblock and Pyper. 1999), labour market 
events are more likely to generate the positive events of exit and the negative 
events of entry into child poverty. The results also suggest the greater importance 
of labour market events compared to marriage market events in New  Zealand 
relative to Britain and West Germany. 
10 Conclusion 
This study is the first to use the New  Zealand LIS for household 
longitudinal analysis. No insurmountable obstacles exist to using the LIS for these 
purposes. The LIS provides a useful adjunct to current and likely future 
longitudinal data in New  Zealand. As the data set accumulates, it will enable 
consideration of time series changes in probabilities of child and adult income 
transitions. In addition, “stacking” the data over a number of years may provide 
interesting income transition information allowing comparisons for smaller 
population groups. When 2000/01 data becomes available, this gives more child 
transitions, since the theoretical match for dwellings will again be back up to one 
half from the one quarter of 1998/99 and 1999/2000 surveys. 44 
The short-range household income transition data, both for adults and 
for children, may well be valuable for future Ministry social monitoring, given 
that it is annually available data on a pertinent social policy issue that has not thus 
far been used for social monitoring purposes. As Jenkins (1998, p. 2) puts it “[t]he 
extent of mobility and poverty persistence are important social indicators to be 
placed alongside information about the income distribution at a point in time”. 
However, while use of the data is feasible, researchers must continually 
be aware of data limitations. The primary limitations are that the LIS is not a 
longitudinal design, with the Imputation and attrition for the pooled LIS data—
numbers, row percentages, and column percentages sample being geographically 
based. Only one annual income transition is observed. The issues of the 
limitations of the LIS as a longitudinal data set have been considered in detail and, 
where possible, sensitivity analysis has been used to examine whether the 
limitations matter. It is of some comfort that other countries, for example Spain, 
have used similar data sets to the LIS for similar purposes. 
It is hoped that one of the spin-offs of this project is that researchers and 
policy makers are persuaded that this data has something to offer. It is also to be 
hoped that our creation and testing of the data lowers the costs for others 
considering working in the area. 
What does the study show? First, not all children in poverty at any point 
in time will stay there. A large proportion shift out. A large proportion of children 
not in poverty will shift into poverty. There is evidence of considerable circulation 
into and out of poverty but also children who remain in poverty on a year by year 
basis. Facing up to transitions forces policymakers to consider poverty policy in a 
different way. In affect it forces a focus on the “streams” flowing in and out of the 
“pond” rather than the “pond” alone. A focus on flows rather than stocks gets 
researchers and policy makers closer to behavioural and causal mechanisms than 
the standard static cross-sectional “ponds” approach. In so doing, it suggests that 
different policies may be specified to reduce inflows and increase outflows. 
Overseas data provides evidence of considerable flows in and out of 
poverty as well as considerable multi-year persistence in poverty for a 
considerable number of people. While the New  Zealand LIS data cannot  
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corroborate the latter stylised fact locally, the fact that annual inflows and 
outflows from child poverty are broadly similar to those overseas lends more 
confidence to a belief that there is likely to be significant poverty persistence in 
New  Zealand. This relatively high churning conclusion supports that earlier 
arrived at by Maloney and Barker (2000) using the Christchurch data. 
At the same time, cross-country comparisons between New Zealand and 
others reveal relatively high transitions in New  Zealand into and out of child 
poverty, combined with quite a high relative rate of child poverty compared to 
other countries. These two facts imply that in New Zealand children have a quite 
high relative chance of exposure to poverty over a two-year period. 
New Zealand data also shows that the “middle class” in New Zealand 
are relatively vulnerable to “falling down the ladder” into poverty compared to 
other countries and the mobility observed appears to be genuine, not simply small 
and perhaps inconsequential hops over an arbitrary poverty boundary. 
The study has also presented a consideration of trigger events and 
conditional probabilities of transition in a context that moves at least some way 
towards providing a behavioural structure on the descriptive statistics. 
New Zealand generates a much lower probability of exit from poverty for children 
in lone parent households relative to children in couple households in Britain and 
West Germany. 
Data examined reveals that New Zealand is much less successful than 
both Britain and West Germany in translating positive events for poor children 
like parental re-partnering and the household gaining a full-time worker—key 
proximate causal events—into a child poverty exit for lone parent families. On the 
other hand, New Zealand appears to be far more efficient in translating labour 
market events like gaining a full-time worker and experiencing an economically 
significant rise in labour earnings into poverty exits for poor children in couple 
households than either Britain or West Germany. At the same time New Zealand 
appears to be good at generating positive job gains for poor children in couple 
households compared to Britain and West Germany. 
In terms of commonality between poor children in lone parent and 
couple households in New Zealand, in the case of an economically significant rise 46 
in labour earnings into a poverty exit, New Zealand again appears more efficient 
than either Britain or West Germany. 
Overall, the trigger events analysis re-emphasises the importance of 
labour market shocks and responses for generating child exits from poverty 
compared to demographic events. Demographic events and marriage market 
events are less frequent and in New  Zealand are more likely to generate the 
positive events of exit and the negative events of entry into child poverty. 
Some possibilities for future work include further pooling of the data 
set with 2000/20001 data, allowing more in-depth multivariate analysis of 
transitions and trigger events. Considering the exit and entry rates in terms of a 
explicit behavioural/multivariate approach may also be of some value. Work 
could also be done to longitudinally impute missing income data, be that data 
missing for one or both Income Supplements, which would increase sample size 
and variation and thus lower standard errors.  
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Appendix A:  Modelling Family Assistance 
Payments 
Family assistance is financial help for families with children who are 
aged 18 years or under and living at home and financially dependent. 
Family income includes all income from parents, including income 
from work and other sources (for example income tested benefit). Income tested 
benefits include the domestic purposes, widow's transitional retirement, invalid's, 
independent youth, emergency, and community wage. 
Family assistance is available for children who are not working full-
time (not more than 30 hours a week), and are not receiving a benefit, student 
allowance or other government assistance, and are 17 years or younger, or who 
are 18 years and still studying. 
Family assistance is paid for a child until the end of the calendar year 
(31 December) when the child turns 18, or the date when the child becomes 
financially independent, whichever is the earlier. 
Payments are to the principal child carer, responsible for the day-to-day 
care of the children. The principal child carer is not someone who cares for the 
children part-time or who works as the child minder. 
Families can choose to receive fortnightly payments based on their 
expected annual family income. This means that the family or IRD settle the 
difference at the end of the year if the expected income did not match the actual as 
a lump sum after 31 March based on actual income. 
The family support tax credit is available to working families who do 
not receive any income tested benefit from WINZ. If a family receives any 
income tested benefit, then if a family’s total income is less than $20,000 a year, 
WINZ pays out Family Support. If a family’s total income is more than $20,000 a 
year, then IRD pays out Family Support. 
The amounts vary over time and according to the age and number of 
children. Up until the end of 1997, the payment for the eldest child was $2444 and 
for other children, payments for those between 16 and 18 were $2080, and those 
younger than 16 were $1664. From 1998 payments for the eldest child were  
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$2444 ($3120 if aged 16–18), $3120 for other 16–18 year olds, $2080 for 13–15 
year olds and $1664 for children less than 13. 
There is also a child tax credit that is unavailable if a family received an 
income tested benefit of any kind from WINZ. The amount is $750 per year. 
The Family Tax Credit is designed to bring the family income up to at 
least $18,368 a year ($286 after tax each week). To receive Family Tax Credit, at 
least one parent must be working for salary or wages for at least 20 hours (single 
parent family) or 30 hours (two parent family). In general, families do not qualify 
for Family Tax Credit for any weeks when family income is from New Zealand 
Superannuation or a student allowance, self-employed earnings, shareholder-
employee earnings, or a close company in which people have at least a 10% 
shareholding, or from a partner’s employment. When a parent receives any of the 
above, the only way they may still qualify for Family Tax Credit is if they or their 
partner also work the required hours for another employer. 
People do not qualify at all for Family Tax Credit for any weeks when 
family income is from an income-tested benefit, a Veteran's Pension, or Parent's 
Allowance. 
To receive family assistance payments fortnightly from IRD a family 
has to estimate its forthcoming annual income. If a family’s estimated income is 
different to their actual income then the family may be in danger of having to pay 
back money to IRD (or vice versa). Annual payments are made at the end of the 
tax year and are automatically calculated by IRD and paid to the family. 
The HLFS-IS asks people about income received over the previous 
fortnight. It is assumed that annual family assistance payments from IRD are not 
picked up. Therefore family assistance payments were imputed onto eligible 
families. All families that declare family assistance are assumed to be providing 
the correct information and, therefore, do not receive any modelled family 
assistance. 
The HLFS-IS contains flags that indicate what benefits an individual 
receives. However, the payment received from WINZ is not disaggregated to 
reveal how much is attributed to each benefit. All families receiving an income 52 
tested benefit from WINZ and having a family gross annual income of less than 
$20,000 are assumed to get the correct family support payments from WINZ. 
Families that do not receive any income from WINZ and that receive 
some of their income from WINZ and have an annual gross family income greater 
than $20,000 receive family assistance payments from IRD. 
Family assistance payments are calculated based upon taxable income, 
but are added in once tax rates have been applied. 
The Parental Tax Credit (PTC) is currently not implemented as the 
HLFS-IS data set contains age in years. The PTC is paid for the first eight weeks 
of a child’s life and cannot be calculated on a per child basis.  
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Appendix B:  Standard Errors for the LIS 
Table 23: Standard error tables based on a random sample (95% 
confidence) multiplied by two to create errors from a stratified and 
clustered sample 
Sample Size  Estimated % 
  5%  10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 60% 
100  8.5%  11.8% 14.0% 15.7% 17.0% 18.0% 18.7% 19.2% 19.5% 19.6% 19.2% 
200 6.0% 8.3% 9.9% 11.1%  12.0%  12.7% 13.2% 13.6% 13.8% 13.9% 13.6% 
300 4.9% 6.8% 8.1% 9.1% 9.8% 10.4% 10.8% 11.1% 11.3% 11.3% 11.1% 
400 4.3% 5.9% 7.0% 7.8% 8.5% 9.0% 9.3% 9.6% 9.8% 9.8% 9.6% 
500 3.8% 5.3% 6.3% 7.0% 7.6% 8.0% 8.4% 8.6% 8.7% 8.8% 8.6% 
600 3.5% 4.8% 5.7% 6.4% 6.9% 7.3% 7.6% 7.8% 8.0% 8.0% 7.8% 
700 3.2% 4.4% 5.3% 5.9% 6.4% 6.8% 7.1% 7.3% 7.4% 7.4% 7.3% 
800 3.0% 4.2% 4.9% 5.5% 6.0% 6.4% 6.6% 6.8% 6.9% 6.9% 6.8% 
900 2.8% 3.9% 4.7% 5.2% 5.7% 6.0% 6.2% 6.4% 6.5% 6.5% 6.4% 
1000  2.7% 3.7% 4.4% 5.0% 5.4% 5.7% 5.9% 6.1% 6.2% 6.2% 6.1% 
1100  2.6% 3.5% 4.2% 4.7% 5.1% 5.4% 5.6% 5.8% 5.9% 5.9% 5.8% 
1200  2.5% 3.4% 4.0% 4.5% 4.9% 5.2% 5.4% 5.5% 5.6% 5.7% 5.5% 
1300  2.4% 3.3% 3.9% 4.3% 4.7% 5.0% 5.2% 5.3% 5.4% 5.4% 5.3% 
1400  2.3% 3.1% 3.7% 4.2% 4.5% 4.8% 5.0% 5.1% 5.2% 5.2% 5.1% 
1500  2.2% 3.0% 3.6% 4.0% 4.4% 4.6% 4.8% 5.0% 5.0% 5.1% 5.0% 
1600  2.1% 2.9% 3.5% 3.9% 4.2% 4.5% 4.7% 4.8% 4.9% 4.9% 4.8% 
1700  2.1% 2.9% 3.4% 3.8% 4.1% 4.4% 4.5% 4.7% 4.7% 4.8% 4.7% 
1800  2.0% 2.8% 3.3% 3.7% 4.0% 4.2% 4.4% 4.5% 4.6% 4.6% 4.5% 
1900  2.0% 2.7% 3.2% 3.6% 3.9% 4.1% 4.3% 4.4% 4.5% 4.5% 4.4% 
2000  1.9% 2.6% 3.1% 3.5% 3.8% 4.0% 4.2% 4.3% 4.4% 4.4% 4.3% 
2100  1.9% 2.6% 3.1% 3.4% 3.7% 3.9% 4.1% 4.2% 4.3% 4.3% 4.2% 
2200  1.8% 2.5% 3.0% 3.3% 3.6% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1% 4.2% 4.2% 4.1% 
2300  1.8% 2.5% 2.9% 3.3% 3.5% 3.7% 3.9% 4.0% 4.1% 4.1% 4.0% 
2400  1.7% 2.4% 2.9% 3.2% 3.5% 3.7% 3.8% 3.9% 4.0% 4.0% 3.9% 
2500  1.7% 2.4% 2.8% 3.1% 3.4% 3.6% 3.7% 3.8% 3.9% 3.9% 3.8% 
2600  1.7% 2.3% 2.7% 3.1% 3.3% 3.5% 3.7% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 
2700  1.6% 2.3% 2.7% 3.0% 3.3% 3.5% 3.6% 3.7% 3.8% 3.8% 3.7% 
2800  1.6% 2.2% 2.6% 3.0% 3.2% 3.4% 3.5% 3.6% 3.7% 3.7% 3.6% 
2900  1.6% 2.2% 2.6% 2.9% 3.2% 3.3% 3.5% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 
3000  1.6% 2.1% 2.6% 2.9% 3.1% 3.3% 3.4% 3.5% 3.6% 3.6% 3.5% 
3100  1.5% 2.1% 2.5% 2.8% 3.0% 3.2% 3.4% 3.4% 3.5% 3.5% 3.4% 
3200  1.5% 2.1% 2.5% 2.8% 3.0% 3.2% 3.3% 3.4% 3.4% 3.5% 3.4% 
3300  1.5% 2.0% 2.4% 2.7% 3.0% 3.1% 3.3% 3.3% 3.4% 3.4% 3.3% 
3400  1.5% 2.0% 2.4% 2.7% 2.9% 3.1% 3.2% 3.3% 3.3% 3.4% 3.3% 
3500  1.4% 2.0% 2.4% 2.7% 2.9% 3.0% 3.2% 3.2% 3.3% 3.3% 3.2% 
3600  1.4% 2.0% 2.3% 2.6% 2.8% 3.0% 3.1% 3.2% 3.3% 3.3% 3.2% 
3700  1.4% 1.9% 2.3% 2.6% 2.8% 3.0% 3.1% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 
3800  1.4% 1.9% 2.3% 2.5% 2.8% 2.9% 3.0% 3.1% 3.2% 3.2% 3.1% 
3900  1.4% 1.9% 2.2% 2.5% 2.7% 2.9% 3.0% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 
4000  1.4% 1.9% 2.2% 2.5% 2.7% 2.8% 3.0% 3.0% 3.1% 3.1% 3.0% 
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  Motu Economic and Public Policy is a non-profit Research Institute (Charitable Trust) 
that has been registered since 1 September, 2000. The Trust aims to promote well-informed and 
reasoned debate on public policy issues relevant to New Zealand decision making. Motu is 
independent and does not advocate an expressed ideology or political position.  
  Motu aims to enhance the economic research and policy environment in New Zealand by 
carrying out high quality independent research, teaching through universities and other institutions, 
training junior research staff, facilitating networks of researchers, hosting foreign researchers and 
organising small conferences and dialogue groups. It is our belief that objective research and 
analysis is a critical foundation for making informed policy decisions and we are committed to 
wide dissemination of our work.  
  Motu's primary strength lies in its people. All of our principal researchers have PhDs in 
economics from top international universities as well as extensive public policy-related work 
experience. Our distinctive contribution is an emphasis on sound empirical analysis, supported by 
our expertise in and knowledge of economic theory and institutional design. We choose research 
areas that build on the interests and expertise of our principal researchers. Our current priorities are 
in the areas of environmental regulation, labour and social policy, and macroeconomics. 
  We maintain strong links with a large pool of internationally renowned experts in our 
chosen fields. These international linkages are critical to our success, and one of our major 
contributions to New Zealand.  
  Our research funding is primarily in the form of research grants. We see this as a means 
of maintaining our commitment to the quality and objectivity of our research. We are able to 
compete internationally for such funding because of the calibre of our principal researchers and 
because of international fascination with the New Zealand reforms. Some of our funding comes 
from foreign foundations and governments. This serves not only to expand the available pool of 
research on New Zealand policy issues, but also to stimulate wider interest in these issues. We also 
seek unrestricted funding from individuals, foundations and corporations to allow us to build a 
stronger research infrastructure within Motu and the wider research community. This allows us to 
actively disseminate ideas, create longer term independent research programs that do not meet 
short-term funding priorities, and organise networks and conferences involving other researchers 
and policy analysts. 
Motu purposes 
1.   Carrying out and facilitating empirical and theoretical research on public policy 
issues relevant to New Zealand; the quality of the research will meet international 
academic standards, suitable for acceptance in reputable academic journals. 
2.  Making existing knowledge more accessible for policy debates in New Zealand; this 
may be done by summarising and critically reviewing existing work on public policy 
issues, or by contributing to and facilitating policy discussions through seminars, 
workshops, and dialogue groups. 
3.  Disseminating the results of our work and knowledge through publication (particularly 
in refereed publications), the internet, conferences, seminars, workshops, dialogue 
groups, and teaching. 
4.  Building New Zealand capacity to carry out empirical and theoretical research on New 
Zealand public policy.  This will be done through means such as training, 
collaboration, sponsorship of students or researchers and development of New 
Zealand databases.        
5.  Maintaining close links with international experts working on topics related to our 
purpose through communication and collaboration. 
6.  Advancing our work and purpose within New Zealand by facilitating the visits of 
relevant international visitors. 
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